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Abstract
For more than 50 years, researchers around the world have been searching for a solution
to Blacks famous “dividend-puzzle”. However, despite tremendous eﬀorts in diﬀerent
ﬁelds of economics, the inﬂuence of taxation on the distribution policy of ﬁrms has
remained elusive and is still subject to extensive debate amongst scholars, professionals
and politicians alike. In this paper, we try to shed some light on the discussion by
presenting new empirical evidence from German tax reforms. Using a sample containing
all ﬁrms listed at the Frankfurt stock exchange in the years from 1993 to 2009, we ﬁnd
robust evidence, that the switch from a split-rate tax system with full imputation to
a shareholder relief system in 2002 and the change to a ﬂat tax system in 2009 led to
signiﬁcant changes in the payout behavior of German ﬁrms. In line with the “traditional
view” of dividend taxation, German decision-makers cut back their dividend payments
in response to the reduced advantageousness of dividends in comparison to capital
gains after the reform.
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Tax eﬀects on the distribution policy of corporations have been at the center of an
intense debate in the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate ﬁnance and
business taxation for over half a century. Under the assumption of perfect markets,
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that at each point in time a shareholder can realize
retained earnings by selling his share on the capital market and realizing the capital
gain stemming from the retention.1 Dividends and capital gains are literally the same
and distribution policy is irrelevant.
Of course, this assumption does not hold in reality. Under many corporate tax systems,
a clearly preferential tax treatment of capital gains compared to dividends can be
observed (La Porta et al. (2000), p. 14, table 3). In the neoclassical world of the
irrelevance theorem, the implications of this market imperfection are clear. Asymmetric
taxation of the two alternatives makes distribution policy relevant and in this case,
dividend payments can not be an optimal policy in equilibrium (Brennan (1970), p.
424). Consequently, a ﬁrm should not pay out any dividend to its shareholders (Black
(1976), p. 9). Clearly, this result stands in contradiction to the observable reality
on ﬁnancial markets where billions of Euros are distributed to shareholders each year.
This obvious contradiction led to Black’s famous statement:
“The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle,
with pieces that just don’t ﬁt together.” - Fisher Black (1976), p. 8.
Since then, many scientiﬁc papers from the full spectrum of diﬀerent disciplines of
ﬁnancial economics have searched for an explanation to solve the “dividend puzzle”.2
Some of the ﬁrst insights in the ﬁeld were developed by surveying managers. Most of
the studies ﬁnd a rather minor role of taxes. Signalling-, agency- or behavioral eﬀects
seem to be at the center of managers’ attention when deciding about payout policy
(Lintner (1956), p. 100; Baker et al. (1985), p. 79; Abrutyn/Turner (1990), p. 495;
Frankfurter et al. (2002), p. 208; Frankfurter et al. (2008), p. 38 and p. 41; Brav et al.
1 In the last decades, this mechanism has become more and more important, institutionalized by
corporations launching major share repurchase programs (Pick/Schanz/Niemann (2009), p. 3).
2 See Allen/Michaely (2003) for an extensive overview over the relevant literature.
1(2005), p. 499 and pp. 510-515 and Brav et al. (2008), p. 387). A diﬀerent approach
is to study the impact of major tax reforms on the behavior of market participants.
There are numerous studies to diﬀerent tax reforms, mostly from the U.K. and the
U.S.3 One of the best documented and most studied reforms to date is the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003 in the United States. Many
studies ﬁnd evidence for reactions to the reform, which they speciﬁcally attribute to
tax eﬀects on dividend decisions (Poterba (2004), p. 174; Chetty/Saez (2005), p. 813;
Chetty/Saez (2006), p. 125; Auerbach/Hassett (2006), p. 123; Moser (2007), p. 1009
and Brown et al. (2007), p. 1945). However, there also exist papers that perceive
behavioral reactions, but fail to attribute them clearly to the tax reform (Blouin et.
al. (2004), p. 21; Julio/Ikkenberry (2004), p. 93 and Brav et al. (2008), p. 383 and p.
387). Chetty and Saez summarize the research on the JGTRRA by stating that
“These studies have obtained divergent, empirical results, despite using the
same underlying data.” - Ray Chetty and Emmanuel Saez (2006), p. 124.
These results show that even after years of research, the eﬀect of taxation on payout
behavior is still elusive and subject of intense discussions amongst academics.
We analyze the impact of two German tax reforms, the switch from a split-rate tax
system with full imputation to a shareholder relief system in 2002 and the change to a
ﬂat tax system in 2009. We examine the payout policy of the whole set of ﬁrms that
constitute the German stock index CDAX each year since its introduction in 1993. The
CDAX includes all German ﬁrms listed at the Frankfurt stock exchange.
Of course, there exist studies addressing the inﬂuence of taxation on payout behavior
in Germany. In their international study of 33 countries, La Porta et al. (2000, p. 4)
also analyze the eﬀect of the German legal system on agency theory explanations of
dividend policy. Goergen et al. (2005, p. 388 and p. 392) ﬁnd evidence for a higher
ﬂexibility of German distribution decisions, both conﬁrming and augmenting Lintner’s
ﬁndings. Amongst 14 other countries in the European Union, von Eije and Megginson
3 See Poterba and Summers (1984) and Ang et al. (1991) for an analysis of British tax policy from
1954 to 1984, Lie and Lie (1999) for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the U.S., Ayers et al. (2002)
for the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 in the U.S. and Bell and Jenkinson (2002), who analyze
the tax reform of 1997 in the U.K.
2(2008, p. 369) also cover Germany and ﬁnd evidence of a tax eﬀect on payout policy in
their sample. Jacob and Jacob (2011, p. 13 and p. 19) provide the most comprehensive
international survey of tax-induced eﬀects on payout policy to date by analyzing ﬁrms
from 25 countries including Germany. They ﬁnd robust evidence for tax eﬀects in line
with the traditional view of dividend taxation. However, to some extent or another, all
of these studies lack a detailed modeling of the German tax environment concerning
dividends and capital gains. Either they focus on diﬀerent questions and cover tax
implications on dividend policy aside their main analysis, or they have to model the
tax environment in a rather simple way, because of a broad international setting.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, a long
term analysis of the German taxation of dividends and share repurchases and its eﬀect
on ﬁrms’ payout behavior is still lacking in the literature. Second, we model the rel-
evant decision environment of German managers deciding on payout policy as closely
as possible. We consider taxation of dividends and capital gains on the corporate and
the personal level for three diﬀerent classes of investors for each tax system and weigh
the computed marginal tax burdens with the shareholder structure. The paper will be
proceeding as follows: Section 2 will give a brief overview over the literature concerning
possible tax eﬀects on distribution policy and develop the hypothesis. Section 3 will
provide a description of the legal regulations regarding the taxation of dividends and
capital gains in Germany during our observation period and will introduce a tax vari-
able which covers diﬀerences in the tax burden of dividends and capital gains. Section
4 presents the empirical analysis. We describe the sample and provide the univari-
ate analysis. The regression analysis of dividend payments and a supporting analysis
of share repurchases will constitute the main part of the section. In section 5, we
summarize the results and provide an outlook on possible further research.
2 Literature review and hypothesis
In the literature, theoretical approaches for explaining tax inﬂuences on corporations’
payout policy are often separated into diﬀerent “views”. Three major schools of thought
are classiﬁed based on diﬀerent models’ assumptions, the “tax irrelevance view”, the
“new view” and the “traditional view” of dividend taxation (Poterba/Summers (1985),
3p. 11, p. 14 and p. 20).
2.1 Irrelevance of payout policy
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets and the possibility to separate invest-
ment and ﬁnancing decisions (Modigliani/Miller (1958), p. 288), Miller and Modigliani
(1961, p. 425 and p. 431) show that distribution policy is irrelevant because it only
adjusts the weight between two equivalent alternatives. They note, that this might
change under market imperfections like taxation. This is not necessarily the case. The
clientele theory, formulated and analyzed in detail by Elton and Gruber (1970, p. 71)
and later by Black and Scholes (1974, p. 2 and p. 21) extends the conclusions of the
irrelevance theorem. Under the assumption of progressive tax rates and unfavorable
taxation of dividends with respect to capital gains, the theory states that shareholders
in higher tax brackets will rather hold shares of corporations that retain signiﬁcant
amounts of their earnings, so that they beneﬁt from the lower tax rates on capital
gains (Litzenberger/Ramaswami (1980), p. 471). Following this reasoning, each ﬁrm
has its speciﬁc tax clientele, composed of investors preferring the particular distribu-
tion policy of the company. In their distribution decision, managers do not have to
consider tax consequences, because their clientele will simply change in adaption to
the new policy and every clientele values their respective ﬁrm in the same way. In this
setting, distribution policy is irrelevant, even in the presence of taxation.
Under the tax irrelevance view, tax reforms altering the taxation of dividends relative
to capital gains have no inﬂuence on the payout policy of a ﬁrm.
2.2 The new view of dividend taxation
The new view focusses on the distribution of free cash ﬂows through dividends by
mature ﬁrms (Gordon (1959), p. 101; King (1974 a) p. 30; King (1974 b), p. 32;
King (1977); Bradford (1981), p. 18 and Auerbach (1983), p. 925). These ﬁrms have
proﬁts exceeding their investment possibilities and ﬁnance investments with retained
earnings (Sinn (1991), p. 29). Equity is literally trapped inside the ﬁrm. Accumulated
funds can only be distributed by means of dividend payments and the tax burden on
4dividends is inevitable (Zodrow (1991), p. 498). The taxation of dividends reduces
a shareholders income, but at the same time, it also reduces the opportunity cost of
retention (Sørensen (1995), p. 283). Thus, dividend taxation does not inﬂuence the
cost of capital. Auerbach (1979, p. 440 and p. 441) demonstrates, using a discrete-
time inﬁnite-horizon model with diﬀerential taxation of dividends and capital gains,
that dividend policy is independent from the dividend tax rate and in the end irrelevant
for decision-makers and stockholders alike.
Under the new view, tax reforms can only inﬂuence the payout decision of ﬁrms if they
are temporary, creating one-time opportunities for payout. In case of the tax reforms
of 2002 and 2009 in Germany, there were no indications of a temporary nature and
German ﬁrms should not have changed their payout policy.
2.3 The traditional view of dividend taxation
In the traditional view of dividend taxation, newly issued shares are the marginal source
of investment funding (Harberger (1962), p. 227; Harberger (1966); Shoven (1976), p.
1274 and p. 1276, table 4 and Poterba/Summers (1985), p. 23). Dividend taxation
inﬂuences the cost of capital in this setting, because investors compare the cash ﬂow
they receive from a stock investment to the cash ﬂow of other possible investments
(Sinn (1991), p. 27). Diﬀerential taxation of capital gains and dividends creates a
preference towards the favored alternative amongst the shareholders (Sørensen (1995),
p. 280). A reform altering the relative taxation of dividends compared to capital gains
will directly inﬂuence the payout policy of ﬁrms.
When reviewing empirical literature on the impact of actual tax reforms on payouts,
there is ample evidence of tax induced reactions in the distribution policy of ﬁrms. In
reaction to the JGTRRA tax reform of 2003 in the United States, Chetty and Saez
(2005, p. 813) report an immediate increase in total dividends of more than 20% in the
ﬁrst six quarters after the reform. Poterba (2004, p. 174) further predicts a long-run
increase of 31% or $111 billion in dividend payouts. Both studies directly attribute
these increases to the tax reform. These reactions support the traditional view of
dividend taxation.
5The German reform of 2002 signiﬁcantly reduced the advantageousness of dividends
compared to capital gains. Considering the empirical evidence, we expect a behavioral
response by German ﬁrms in form of a reduction of dividend payments in line with
the traditional view. The reform of 2009 aligned the tax burden on both distribution
alternatives. Capital gains were treated less favorable than before for some investors.
This should lead to increased dividend payments.
H1: If a reform changes the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains
in favor of dividends (capital gains), ﬁrms will increase (reduce) their
dividend distributions.
Capital gains are tax advantaged compared to dividends in many tax systems, creat-
ing a preference for capital gains amongst investors and making dividend payout less
attractive. The traditional view explains the resulting dividend puzzle with a simple
economic opportunity cost approach. For various reasons not directly related to taxa-
tion, dividends intrinsically generate utility beyond their basic function of transferring
invested funds back to the shareholders (Gerardi et al. (1990), p. 310). The literature
under asymmetric information as well as the analysis of human behavior has produced
various explanations for this mechanism. Decision-makers weigh the beneﬁts provided
by dividends against their cost, the often unfavorable taxation. The result of this
cost-utility analysis deﬁnes the ﬁrms payout rate, which is thus dependent on the tax
rates.
2.4 Non-tax inﬂuences on distribution policy
The literature on corporate payout behavior has suggested various inﬂuences on dis-
tribution policy apart from taxation. DeAngelo et al. (2008, p. 116) provide an
extensive survey of possible motives to pay out dividends. One signiﬁcant body of lit-
erature states for instance, that managers use dividends to signal proﬁtability to their
investors. According to the signalling theory, more proﬁtable ﬁrms will pay out higher
dividends (Lintner (1956), p. 101; Watts (1973), p. 192; Battacharya (1979), p. 260;
Battacharya/Hakansson (1982), p. 419; Baker et al. (1985), p. 79; Miller/Rock (1985),
p. 1040 and p. 1045 and Bernheim/Wantz (1995), p. 533).
6One of the key elements of agency theory is the likely divergence of incentives between
principal and agent, inducing the danger of managerial behavior in conﬂict to the goal
of maximized shareholder value. Monitoring this behavior generates agency costs. Div-
idend distributions can be used to mitigate these agency costs by simply reducing the
cash ﬂows which could be sub-optimally invested by managers. However, if decision-
makers own a signiﬁcant part of the shares of their ﬁrm, the incentives of shareholders
and managers will be better aligned and the necessity for dividends as a method of
control declines. Further, the presence of strong shareholders or the ﬁnancing of in-
vestments through the capital market reduce the need to pay dividends because both
extensively control managerial behavior (Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308, p. 312 and
p. 346; Rozeﬀ (1982), p. 250; Easterbrook (1984), p. 652; Jensen (1986), p. 325; Stulz
(1990), p. 8 and Allen et al. (2000), p. 2509 and p. 2519).
According to pecking order- and life-cycle theories of dividend policy, ﬁrms preferen-
tially ﬁnance their investments with retained earnings and in turn, managers adapt
their distribution policy to the availability of advantageous investment opportunities.
Particularly young, fast growing ﬁrms will retain a large proportion of their earnings to
ﬁnance their investments and consequently pay lower dividends (Myers/Majluf (1984),
p. 194 and p. 217; Myers (1984), p. 581 and Grullon et al. (2002), p. 413 and p. 422).
By relaxing assumptions such as unlimited information processing capability or perfect
rationality, the relatively new ﬁeld of behavioral economics provides further possible
explanations for a preference towards dividends amongst investors (Shefrin/Statman
(1984), p. 257, p. 265 and p. 268; Roll (1986), p. 202 and p. 206; Heaton (2002), p.
41; Ritter (2003), p. 431; Baker/Wurgler (2004), p. 1127 and p. 1147 and Baker et al.
(2007), p. 4).
3 Legal framework: Taxation of dividends and
capital gains in Germany
This section will provide the legal framework necessary for calculating the total tax
burden on dividends relative to capital gains on the shareholder level. This relation
7is expressed in form of the tax variable µ (Poterba/Summers (1984), p. 1400).4 To
get an adequate picture of the tax environment in which distribution policy is made,
the relative tax burden µ will be modeled with respect to the tax-status of three types
of shareholders: individual investors without substantial interest, individual investors
with substantial interest and corporate investors.
In Germany, there have been two major reforms of the taxation of capital income since
1993. In the year 2001, the tax reduction act “Steuersenkungsgesetz” established the
transfer from a split-rate full imputation system to a classical system with shareholder
relief, the half-income system “Halbeinkünfteverfahren”, ﬁrst eﬀective in the assessment
period of 2002. The business tax reform act of 2008 “Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz
2008” again reformed the taxation of distributions in Germany with the transfer to a
ﬂat tax system “Abgeltungsteuer” in 2009. Additionally, there have been several minor
changes mostly regarding variations in the tax rates. Table 1 provides an overview over
the evolution of individual and corporate tax rates from 1993 to 2009.
< Insert table 1 about here >
3.1 1977-2001: Split-rate tax system with full imputation
With the corporate tax reform act “Körperschaftsteuerreformgesetz” of 1976, the then
eﬀective classical corporate tax system was replaced with a new full imputation system.
The aim of the reform was to eliminate the double taxation of corporate proﬁts by
crediting the corporate taxes paid on the ﬁrm level against the income tax liability
of the shareholders. In case of a dividend distribution, the shareholder received the
dividend and a tax credit corresponding to the corporate tax payment. In eﬀect, the
corporate tax burden was completely neutralized and the total tax burden equaled the
marginal income tax rate of the particular shareholder. Capital gains did not qualify
for a tax credit. However, capital gains were not taxable in Germany if the shareholder
privately held a minor share in the company, i.e. his share of voting stock was smaller
than the threshold for substantial interest and if the investor held the asset long enough
4 In these calculations we assume that retained earnings induce appreciations of the stock at the
value of the retention. A shareholder can always realize this capital gain through the sale of his
share, rendering dividends and capital gains equal alternatives for distribution.
8to exceed the speculative period.5
An individual shareholder with substantial interest receiving a dividend faced exactly
the same tax liability as a shareholder without substantial interest. Capital gains,
however, were reclassiﬁed as business income and were subject to full personal income
tax. Under these circumstances, the tax burden on capital gains in Germany was com-
parably high and the German tax code provided diﬀerent measures of relief. However,
all these options were either marginal or entailed strict requirements or limitations,
technically resulting in only minor reductions of the tax burden.6
Dividend distributions to corporations were generally treated in the same way as div-
idends distributed to personal investors under the German full imputation system.
Capital gains stemming from the sale of shares of resident corporations were taxed as
ordinary business income, subject to the full corporate tax rate on both levels. They
did not qualify for a tax credit in the imputation system. This led to a relatively high
burden for corporations, too.
3.2 2002-2008: Half-income system
In the year 2000, the tax reduction act “Steuersenkungsgesetz” installed the half-income
system, a classic system with shareholder relief. It was ﬁrst eﬀective for shareholders
in 2002, the ﬁrst year in which distributions of earnings generated under the new
corporate tax law were possible. The primary goal of the reform was to reduce personal
and corporate tax rates in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the German tax
system. Under the new system, the problem of double taxation was solved by the
combined eﬀect of lower tax rates and a partial exemption of distributions from the
5 We assume a holding period exceeding the respective speculative period for the calculations in this
paper.
6 Until 1999, it was allowed to apply a reduced rate of 50% of the particular average personal income
tax rate on capital gains stemming from the sale of a substantial share of a corporation. However,
this relief was only applied to capital gains below 15 million DM. Given a threshold for substantial
interest of 25% at the time and an average goodwill of around 380 million Euros in the sample,
the eﬀect of this option is negligible for the calculation of the marginal tax burden. Further, the so
called ﬁfth-part rule “Fünftelregelung” alleviated the burden of unfavorable progression-peaks by
mathematically distributing the taxable capital gain over a period of ﬁve years. Here, a relief only
occurred, if the investor was not already in the maximum tax bracket. The German tax code also
granted an allowable deduction of 20,000 DM. But this deduction was multiplied by the fraction
of the share of the corporation that was sold and bounded by an upper limit. Because of these
heavy constraints, these measures are not explicitly modeled in this paper.
9tax base of the shareholder. In case of an investor without substantial interest receiving
dividend income, the total tax burden on the shareholder level consisted of the new
uniform corporate tax, and the personal tax rate levied on 50% of the dividend. The
combined burden was similar to the burden on income from other sources. As in the
preceding full imputation system, the disposal of privately held shares was not taxable,
so the tax burden on capital gains consisted of the corporate tax only.
Conceptually, the new tax code was designed to implement an identical tax burden on
dividends and capital gains. Therefore, apart from the case presented above, the two
alternatives were treated equally. This was achieved by recognizing only 50% of all
capital gains as taxable income. For investors with substantial interest, the tax burden
on dividends and capital gains was calculated in the same way, as a combination of the
corporate tax and the personal tax, levied on 50% of the respective income.
The problem of double or multiple taxation of distributions between corporations was
solved by the “dividend privilege”. Dividends paid from one corporation to another
were exempt from tax. This regulation applied to foreign and domestic dividends alike
and was not bound to any form of minimum share or holding period. However, 5%
of the dividend received were deemed as non-deductable business expense and had to
be taxed by the receiving corporation. Moreover, corporate capital gains from the
disposal of shares were also 95% tax-free, resulting in an equal treatment of dividends
and capital gains for corporate investors.
3.3 2009-today: Flat tax system
With the business tax reform act of 2008 “Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 2008”, the
shareholder relief system was abolished in favor of a new ﬂat tax system eﬀective for
shareholders from the ﬁrst of January 2009. The aim of the reform was to continually
increase Germany’s attractiveness as a business location, to provide neutrality regard-
ing the legal form and the ﬁnancing structure of ﬁrms and to simplify tax planning for
both, ﬁrms and the government. The new system is designed as a classical corporate
tax system with a ﬂat tax rate. The problem of double taxation of distributed corpo-
rate proﬁts is mitigated by a reduced rate on the shareholder level. First, the corporate
income tax is levied on the full corporate proﬁt. Second, a ﬂat rate of 25% is applied to
10all income from dividends and capital gains received by individuals privately holding
shares. For investors with substantial interest, a partial inclusion system is applied.
In addition to the corporate tax, 60% of all income from dividends or capital gains is
taxed at the personal income tax rate, the remaining 40% of income are exempt from
taxation. If another corporation is the shareholder, dividends as well as capital gains
are not taxed, as in the former system. Again, 5% of the distribution are deemed as
non-deductable business expense and subject to corporate tax at the receiving corpo-
ration. Table 2 shows the tax burden for all three types of shareholders under the
diﬀerent German tax regimes from 1993 until 2009.
< Insert table 2 about here >
3.4 The relative tax burden
To analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerent tax regimes on the distribution policy of corporations,
a variable depicting the taxation of the alternatives a manager faces in his decision
process is needed. In the literature, the relative tax burden µ is often calculated
by relating the marginal tax rates on dividends (tdiv) and capital gains (tcg) on the




In this equation, a value of 1 indicates equal taxation of dividends and capital gains,
while values below 1 indicate a preferential treatment of capital gains. The relative
tax burdenµ will change with time, depicting the inﬂuence of tax reforms through tax
rates and regimes described in the previous sections (Li (2007), p. 8). Table 3 shows
the evolution of the tax variable µ in Germany from 1993 until 2009.
< Insert table 3 about here >
However, in most tax systems, the tax variable µ will ﬂuctuate not only with time, but
also between diﬀerent groups of shareholders. Diﬀerent values of µ result in dissimi-
lar preferences amongst the groups concerning the way corporate earnings should be
distributed. These diﬀerences pose a potential problem for managers deciding upon
11the optimal distribution policy of their company. They have only one tool, the deci-
sion between either retention or distribution of earnings, to satisfy multiple, possibly
conﬂicting demands. In this setting, reasonable managers will make their decision con-
siderate of the actual structure of their shareholders’ tax status (Lie/Lie (1999), p.
536). Therefore, the decision has to be based on µavg (Poterba (2004), p. 171), an
average of the values of µj for the s diﬀerent groups of shareholders of each company,
weighted by their respective relative magnitude in the shareholder structure of the






As observable in table 3, the values of the relative tax burden µ for corporations and in-
dividual investors holding a substantial share of stock in the form of business property
are identical. Both of these investor classes have to tax their income from distributions
as business income. For the sake of simplicity, we pool them into the new class “com-
mercial investors”. This leaves us with two classes of investors, individual investors
without substantial interest and commercial investors.
In Germany, complete and reliable data on the shareholder structure of a ﬁrm is often
times not publicly available. To be able to adequately depict the decision environment
around distribution policy despite of this lack of individual data, we use aggregate
data from macroeconomic ﬁnancing statistics provided by the German central Bank
“Bundesbank” to approximate a single ﬁrm’s situation. The statistics show the total
holdings of German stocks by diﬀerent sectors. We subsume the sectors of private
households and other domestic ﬁnancial institutions, which mainly consist of invest-
ment funds that in turn are primarily held by private households, under the investor
class of individual investors. The marginal individual investor is assumed to hold a non-
substantial share in the company (nsub) and to be in the highest tax bracket, leaving
µmax
nsub as the relevant tax variable for this class. The holdings of all other sectors are
subsumed under the class of corporate investors (corp), namely non-ﬁnancial domes-
tic corporations, domestic ﬁnancial- and insurance institutions and public authorities.
The relevant tax variable for this class is µcorp.
12For both investor classes, individual investors and corporate investors, we determine
the fraction of the shares held in the respective sectors on the total shares held in
Germany.7 These fractions serve as our weights wmax
nsub and wcorp when calculating the
weighted average of the tax variable µavg. Based on the aggregate shareholder structure,
the development of the average tax variable is presented in table 4.
< Insert table 4 about here >
When looking at the development of the average tax variable µavg over the years, the
impact of the two tax reforms is clearly visible. The reform of 2002 signiﬁcantly reduced
the disadvantageous taxation of capital gains for individual investors with substantial
interest and corporate investors by alleviating the former double taxation of capital
gains on the corporate- and the shareholder level, resulting in a decline of µavg of more
than 36% between 2001 and 2002. The reform of 2009 abolished the beneﬁcial taxation
of capital gains for individual investors without substantial interest. This aligned the
tax burden on dividends and capital gains for all investors. Consequently, the tax
variable µavg shows a value of 1 for this year.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Sample
We examine the whole set of ﬁrms that constitute the German stock index CDAX,
which includes all German ﬁrms listed at the Frankfurt stock exchange, for the period
from 1993 until 2009. We choose this sample for two reasons. First, the year 1993
is the year the CDAX was introduced by the Frankfurt stock exchange as a broader
alternative to the established DAX, which includes the 30 largest German ﬁrms only.
Second, in the empirical literature about the impact of tax reforms there is evidence
that the behavioral adjustment to a change in tax regimes takes a considerable amount
of time.8 Our time horizon covers 9 years before and 8 years after the fundamental
7 The holdings of foreign investors are not modeled in this paper and are therefore excluded from
the calculation.
8 Feldstein (1970, p. 63) shows that in the ﬁrst year after the British tax reform of 1958, only
43% of the adjustment took place. Miller and Scholes (1982, p. 1138) note, that the analysis of
13reform of the taxation of distributions in 2002. This allows us to draw meaningful
conclusions about the long term impact of the reform. By considering every ﬁrm
existing for at least one year in the period from 1993 to 2009, we avoid possible issues
of survivorship bias in our sample.9 In our observation period, a total of 931 ﬁrms was
included in the CDAX at one time or the other, providing us with 10129 ﬁrm-years. We
collect capital market and ﬁnancial statement data from the September 2010 edition of
the WorldScope database.10 We eliminate all ﬁrm-years with missing data for at least
one variable, which leaves us with 6,371 observations. Finally, to reduce the impact of
outliers on our ﬁndings, we truncate the 1st and/or 100th percentile, as theoretically
plausible, which brings us to our ﬁnal sample of 5,646 ﬁrm-year observations. Table 5
summarizes the composition of our sample and the necessary adjustments.11
< Insert table 5 about here >
Our sample includes a broad set of German ﬁrms from diﬀerent sectors. Panel A of
table 6 provides a breakdown of ﬁrm-years by sectors, divided using the ﬁrst digit of the
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC). With almost 48% of the ﬁrm-years observed,
the manufacturing sector is the largest by far. Over 82% of all ﬁrms are active in
the manufacturing, service or ﬁnancial sector. Panel B of table 6 gives an overview
over a selection of basic ﬁrm parameters. The average ﬁrm in our panel possesses
total assets of around 12 billion Euros and has a market capitalization of over 2 billion
Euros. Of course, these high numbers are heavily inﬂuenced by huge ﬁnancial ﬁrms
short run responses to dividends faces timing problems because the alternative of capital gains is
traditionally realized over longer timescales. Poterba (2004, p. 174) predicts, that in a period of
three years after the reform of dividend taxation by the JGTRRA 2003 in the U.S., only a quarter
of the adjustment process to the new equilibrium will have occurred.
9 See Elton et al. (1996), p. 1100 and p. 1104 for a literature overview concerning survivorship bias
in the empirical analysis of stocks and estimates of the impact of survivorship bias.
10 We use the following items (the respective WorldScope ID’s are given in parentheses): Total Assets
(02999), Total Debt (03255), Market Price - Year End (05001), Common Shares Outstanding
(05301), Market Capitalization (08001), Closely Held Shares (05475), Common Equity (03501),
Pre-tax Income (01401), Cash Dividends Paid (04551) and Common/Preferred Stock Redeemed,
Retired, Converted, etc. (04751).
11 Because of exceptional capital structures and special regulations for banks and insurance compa-
nies possibly aﬀecting payout behavior, many studies exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms from their sample
(Fama/French (2001), p. 6; Amihud/Li (2006), p. 639 and Moser (2007), p. 1000). However,
about 16% of our observations are from the ﬁnancial sector and German ﬁnancial ﬁrms tradition-
ally are substantial dividend payers, commonly included in shareholders’ portfolios. Because of
the signiﬁcant weight of this subgroup, we opt to include these observations in our sample and run
robustness checks to justify this approach.
14like the “Allianz SE” or the “Deutsche Bank AG”, with total assets of around 1 and 2
trillion Euros in 2008, respectively. The values for the 75th percentile show that three
quarters of the sample observations possess total assets lower than 743 million Euros
and a market capitalization below 1.2 billion Euros, with median values of 52% and
21% for earnings and dividends per share, respectively.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
We use a set of reliable and well established variables to test our hypotheses and control
for other major inﬂuences on distribution policy. As dependent variable, we use three
diﬀerent measures of dividend payments in our regressions (Blouin et al. (2004), p. 11;
Chetty/Saez (2005), p. 798; Brav et al. (2008), p. 383 and Jacob/Jacob (2011), p. 13).
Our ﬁrst measure is Divyield, which simply expresses the dividend yield, calculated
by dividing the total dividends paid by a company by its market capitalization. The
mean of this measure is 1.8%, with minimum and maximum values at 0% and 9.6%,
respectively. These values reﬂect the traditional high dividend yield of German ﬁrms.
The second measure we employ is Divpaid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm
paid a dividend in a given year. The mean shows that over our whole sample, almost
60% of the ﬁrms are dividend payers. Our third measure of dividend payout is Divinit,
a dummy with the value 1 for ﬁrms that initiated payments. We deﬁne an initiation
as a positive payment preceded by no payment or, in line with Chetty and Saez (2005,
p. 830), as an intensive increase in dividend payout of at least 20%. In more than one
ﬁfth of the ﬁrm-years in our sample, ﬁrms have initiated or raised dividend payments
by at least 20%. The development of our measures of dividend payments over time is
illustrated in panel A of ﬁgure 1.
< Insert ﬁgure 1 about here >
The ﬁrst ﬁgure of panel A shows the development of the mean of the dividend yield over
time. Two observations are especially interesting. First, there is a drop of the mean
dividend yield from around 2.25% in the years before 2000 to around 1.5% after the
15year 2000, exactly at the time the tax reduction act “Steuersenkungsgesetz” passed,
which severely reduced the advantageous taxation of dividends compared to capital
gains. The correlation between the mean of the dividend yield and time is negative
and highly signiﬁcant. Second, there is a steep increase in dividend yield in the years
after 2008, when the business tax reform act “Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 2008”
passed and aligned the tax treatment of the two alternatives. However, this seems to be
an eﬀect mainly driven by falling stock prices during the economic crisis rather than an
increase in dividend payouts. The second ﬁgure plots the mean of Divpaid, our dummy
variable indicating whether dividends have been paid or not. In Germany, the fraction
of ﬁrms paying dividends is traditionally very high. Over 80% of the ﬁrms in our sample
paid a dividend in 1993. However, the plot clearly shows a declining trend, with only
39% of ﬁrms paying dividends in 2003. As we have shown in table 4, the values of
our tax variable µavg have been declining until 2008 as well, rendering distributions via
dividends less favorable from year to year. Taxation provides one possible explanation
for the disappearance of dividend paying ﬁrms in Germany.12 Finally, the third ﬁgure
shows the evolution of the mean of Divinit, our dividend initiation dummy. Especially
remarkable in this ﬁgure is the steep increase in initiations from about 20% in 1997
to almost 27.5% in 1998, the continual descent to a value of only 8% during the time
of the reform and the return to values of the same magnitude as before the reform
shortly thereafter. It can be argued, that ﬁrms anticipated the upcoming reform and
preliminary distributed a signiﬁcant amount of their reserves to take advantage of the
favorable conditions for dividends prior to the reform of 2002.13 Overall, the ﬁgures
show characteristics of a negative impact on our dividend measures around the year
2002, when the reform of the taxation of capital income took place.
12 Fama and French (2001, p. 7, ﬁg. 1, p. 19 and p. 24) present an additional explanation with
evidence from their U.S. sample from 1926 to 1999. They attribute the disappearance of dividend
paying ﬁrms to a change in the status of the marginal ﬁrm in their sample and a generally lower
propensity to pay dividends for all ﬁrms. This eﬀect is probable for Germany as well. The ﬁrst half
of our observation period is characterized by a steady increase in the number of ﬁrms through new
listings. According to life-cycle approaches to dividend policy, these young ﬁrms are not likely to
pay out dividends. With the burst of the “dotcom” bubble in 2000, many of these newly listed ﬁrms
disappeared and the fraction of dividend payers once again rose to a (signiﬁcantly lower) level of
about 50%. We control for this inﬂuence by implementing measures of growth in our multivariate
analysis.
13 German authorities tried to avert this eﬀect by implementing a transition period of 15 years in
which earnings retained and taxed at the higher rate before the reform still qualiﬁed for the old
tax credit when distributed after the reform. However, many ﬁrms still opted to pay out their
reserves as soon as possible.
16However, there are possible explanations for reduced dividend payments during this
period besides the tax reform. The burst of the U.S. “dotcom” bubble in the year
2000 hit Germany with some delay and it is possible that the following economic
slump dampened payouts. To address this possibility, panel B of ﬁgure 1 controls
for stock market and growth eﬀects by plotting our dividend measure Divyield against
µavg, against Index, a national all-share price index taken from OECD.stat and against
GDPgrowth, the yearly change in gross domestic product, also taken from OECD.stat.
The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows a positive relation between µavg and the dividend yield that is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The other two relations are not signiﬁcant at
conventional levels of conﬁdence. These results conﬁrm our univariate ﬁndings of tax
eﬀects in line with the traditional view of dividend taxation around the reform of 2002.
However, the conclusions taken from these ﬁgures can only serve as a sign post because
of the small sample size of only 16 or 17 observations. The following multivariate
analysis will provide much broader evidence.
To control for the most prominent non-tax inﬂuences on distribution policy, we subject
our regressions to a set of control variables. To control for signalling, we include the
variable Income, representing the pre-tax income divided by total assets. Concerning
agency eﬀects, we include the variable Closely, which includes shares held by insiders
and substantial shareholders, in order to account for possible inﬂuences of executive
stock holdings or strong shareholders on dividend payouts. We further include Lev,
representing Total Debt divided by Total Assets, to control for the inﬂuence of external
ﬁnancing on distributions. Finally, to control for the impact of growth and investment
opportunities on payouts, we introduce the variables Trend, representing the develop-
ment of share prices over the last year and Q, which stands for Tobin’s Q or market
capitalization divided by common equity, into our regressions.
All monetary variables are deﬂated by the consumer price index, taken from the
OECD.stat online database and scaled by total assets, following Fama and French
(1998, p. 822 and 2002, p. 7). To allow for easier interpretation, total dividends paid
and total shares repurchased are scaled by market capitalization, giving the dividend-
and share repurchase yield, respectively. We lag our scale variables by one year to ac-
count for the causality of the assets of period t for the dividends and share repurchases
of period t+1. Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our regressions are
17presented in table 7.
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4.3 Regression analysis
To test our main hypothesis of a positive relation between the relative taxation of div-
idends compared to capital gains µavg and our three measures of dividend payments,
Divyield, Divpaid and Divinit, we employ standard ordinary least squares panel re-
gressions with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to avoid problems due to heteroscedasticity,
we use robust standard errors throughout all our regressions. Speciﬁcally, we test the
following regression equation:
Divi;t = ®0 + ®i + ¯1Incomei;t¡1 + ¯2µ
avg
t + ¯3Trendi;t¡1 + ¯4Closelyi;t¡1
+¯5Levi;t¡1 + ¯6Qi;t¡1 + "i;t
where Divi;t stands for one of the dividend measures Divyieldi;t, Divpaidi;t or Diviniti;t
for ﬁrm i in year t. The ﬁrst three columns of table 8 show the results of the regressions
on our whole sample of 5,646 ﬁrm-years from 1993 to 2009. The results are in line with
tax eﬀects according to the traditional view of dividend taxation. In the regression on
Divyield, presented in column (1), the coeﬃcient for µavg is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A relative increase in the tax burden on dividends, compared
to the burden on capital gains as, for example, in the German tax reform of 2002, has a
negative inﬂuence on the dividend yield of German ﬁrms. A decline of µavg by a value of
0.5, approximately the value of the decline caused by the reform of 2002,14 will reduce
the average dividend yield by about 0.0027 or 14.59% of the mean dividend yield of
0.0185 in our sample. To control for possible signalling eﬀects, we introduced the control
variable Income. Its coeﬃcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant, consistent with the
notion of proﬁtable ﬁrms paying higher dividends to signal their proﬁtability brought
forward in the literature. Further, in order to control for agency eﬀects, we included
Closely and Lev. Both coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% or the 1%
level, respectively. This is consistent with the notion of executive stockholdings and
14 Between 2001 and 2002, µavg declined by a value of 0.525. See table 4 for reference.
18outside control through stock markets both reducing the need for dividend payouts as a
measure of managerial control, presented in the agency literature. Finally, we included
Trend and Q to account for possible eﬀects of growth and investment opportunities,
as stated in pecking order and life-cycle theories. In line with the literature, both
coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Fast growing ﬁrms with good
investment opportunities pay out signiﬁcantly lower dividends.
The results for our second measure of dividend payout, the dummy variable Divpaid
indicating positive dividend payments, is presented in column (2). Again, the coeﬃcient
of the tax variable µavg is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A reduction of µavg
of 0.5, which is equal to 1.65 times the standard deviation of µavg, reduces the fraction
of dividend payers by about 0.077 or 13.00% of the sample mean. As observable in
column (3), the coeﬃcient for the measure of dividend initiations Divinit is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level with a t-value of 2.534. A reduction of µavg in the magnitude
of the tax reform 2002 lowers the likelihood of a ﬁrm to initiate dividend payments
by about 0.032 or 15.12% of the sample mean. The columns (4) to (6) present the
regressions on a sample excluding ﬁrms from the ﬁnancial sector, reducing our sample
size by 16.7% to 4,701 observations. The results do not change considerably. As in the
regressions on the full sample, the coeﬃcients of our tax measures are all negative and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcients of the control variables also show similar
characteristics as in the full sample regressions.15
< Insert table 8 about here >
In our regressions on the dividend yield and the payout dummy, we obtain exceptionally
high values for the adjusted R2 of over 51.7% and 62.5%, respectively. This is because
we opt to include the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the calculation of the coeﬃcient of deter-
mination. There are good reasons to do this. In our sample, models using only ﬁrm
dummies as explanatory variables for Divyield and Divpaid already explain 47.60%
and 58.99% of the variability in the data. This is in line with the overall notion in
the literature, that dividend policy is very conservative and that dividends are “sticky”.
15 We also run regressions excluding ﬁrms from the utility sector and excluding both, ﬁnancial and
utility ﬁrms. In both cases, the results do not change signiﬁcantly.
19Present dividend policy is very dependant on the policy in the past (Lintner (1956), p.
100 and p. 107). This high consistency in a ﬁrm’s dividend policy explains why simple
ﬁrm dummies serve as a very good explanatory variable for dividend payouts. The
inclusion of other explanatory variables such as µavg or Income mainly helps to better
explain the ﬂuctuations around this rather constant level of payouts. Dividend initi-
ations, however, are not constantly recurring events by nature. Consequently, when
analyzing regressions on the initiation dummy Divinit, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects only produce
an adjusted R2 of 7.51%.
4.4 Robustness: share repurchases
Institutionalized share repurchase programs are the most important alternative to div-
idend distributions (Dittmar (2000), p. 333 and p. 348; Grullon/Ikkenberry (2000), p.
35 and p. 48; Jagannathan et al. (2000), p. 361, table 1, p. 374 and p. 377; Grul-
lon/Michaely (2002), p. 1656, p. 1660, p. 1665 and p. 1672 and Brav et al. (2005),
p. 497). Brav et al. (2008, p. 386, ﬁgure 3) show that after a surge of activity in the
mid 1990’s, aggregate share repurchases exceed the sum of dividends paid in the U.S.
today. For a deeper understanding of the eﬀects of taxation on payout policy, and to
further back up the evidence presented in the previous paragraphs, we will take a brief
look at tax implications on share repurchases. If a shareholder receives income from
the disposal of his shares in a share repurchase program, the diﬀerence between the
acquisition costs and the share price the repurchase oﬀers has to be taxed as a capital
gain. Looking at our tax variable µavg, a reduction of dividend taxes will reduce the
relative advantageousness of repurchases. Following the traditional view of dividend
taxation, ﬁrms will buy back less of their own shares after a dividend tax cut and we
expect a negative sign for µavg in the regressions.
In Germany, share repurchases were heavily restricted for the most part of the 20th
century and were only deregulated in 1998 with the enactment of the act for con-
trol and transparency in the business sector “Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz
im Unternehmensbereich”. Because of this, we eliminate all ﬁrm-years prior to 1998,
leaving us with a sample of 3,337 ﬁrm-years for our regressions on share repurchases.
We employ the same methodology as in the dividend regressions before, and test three
20diﬀerent measures of share repurchases. Repyield is the share repurchase yield and
is calculated by scaling the total shares repurchased by a ﬁrm by its market capital-
ization. Reppaid is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm repurchased shares and
Repinit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm has initiated share repurchases or
raised its repurchases by at least 20%. Share repurchases in Germany are still a fairly
rare phenomenon. In our sample, the mean of the share repurchase yield, Repyield, is
only 0.27% with a maximum at about 4.3%. In the years from 1998 to 2009, we iden-
tify 416 ﬁrm-years with active share repurchase programs, implying a mean of 12.5%
for Reppaid. In 289 of our ﬁrm-years, share repurchase programs were initiated or
extended by at least 20%, the mean value for Repinit is about 8.8%.16
Table 9 shows the development of the mean of the share repurchase measure Repyield
and the results of the ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions of our three share repurchase
measures. Panel A presents some univariate analyses. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows the de-
velopment of the mean of the share repurchase yield over time. Apparently, share
repurchases in Germany only started in the year 1998. From then, the share repur-
chase yield grew each year, except for a minor slow-down in the years 2001 and 2002,
possibly in conjunction with the diﬃcult situation on the ﬁnancial markets due to the
dotcom crisis. The second ﬁgure plots the share repurchase yield Repyield against µavg.
In line with our prior ﬁndings, there is a highly signiﬁcant negative relation. However,
this time, when plotting Repyield against Index in the third ﬁgure, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive relation. This indicates the importance of the stock market environment for
share repurchase decisions. Panel B presents the results of the regressions on the three
share repurchase measures Repyield, Reppaid and Repinit. The ﬁrst three columns
show the results of the analysis of the full sample of 3,337 ﬁrm-years from 1998 to 2009.
As expected, the coeﬃcient of µavg is negative and signiﬁcant for all three share repur-
chase measures. The columns (4) to (6) present the regressions excluding ﬁrm-years
from the ﬁnancial sector. Again, the coeﬃcients for all three measures are negative and,
for our measures Repyield and Reppaid, highly signiﬁcant. The inclusion of ﬁnancial
ﬁrms in the analysis does not inﬂuence our results.
16 Due to spatial limitations, we do not report full univariate statistics on our share repurchase
measures. These data are available upon request.
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It is noteworthy that throughout our share repurchase regressions and despite using the
exact same data source and regression techniques, the adjusted R2 is considerably lower
than in our dividend regressions. This is because ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects do not contribute as
much to the coeﬃcient of determination as in case of dividends. Share repurchases are
used as more ﬂexible means of payout and are not “sticky”, a ﬁrms past repurchases
are not a good indication of future repurchases (Jagannathan et al. (2000), p. 367
and Brav et al. (2005), p. 494, table 5). Consequently, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are not as
eﬀective in explaining share repurchases and thus their contribution to the coeﬃcient of
determination is smaller. The evidence presented in panel B clearly backs up our earlier
ﬁndings from the analysis of dividend payouts and again is in line with the traditional
view of dividend taxation. A tax reform reducing the relative tax-advantageousness
of dividends compared to share repurchases, as in Germany in the year 2002, induces
increased share repurchases.
4.5 Ruling out unobserved macroeconomic inﬂuences
It is possible, that the eﬀects of µavg on distribution policy found in our previous regres-
sions are inﬂuenced by the development of unobserved macroeconomic variables as for
instance the GDP, the key interest rate or the development of national or international
stock markets over the observation period.17 We have already provided preliminary
evidence of the robustness of the tax eﬀect to some macroeconomic variables when
presenting the univariate analysis. In a multivariate setting, we tackle this problem
in the form of a diﬀerences in diﬀerences approach. We divide our sample into two
subgroups with diﬀerential tax sensitivity and assume, that both of these groups react
uniformly to changes in the macroeconomic inﬂuences in question. In the literature,
it is stated that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing structure depends on the stage of its development
(Sinn (1991), p. 39). Young, fast growing ﬁrms often have investment opportunities
exceeding their funds and thus rely on equity ﬁnancing. They will react in line with
17 In our setting, µavg is the same for all ﬁrms in a given year and a given value of the tax variable
uniquely identiﬁes a certain year. This means, that µavg can also be interpreted as a dummy
variable for each year, depicting the inﬂuence of time. Thus, µavg may also show the inﬂuences of
other variables that have the same value for all ﬁrms in a given year.
22the traditional view, which predicts a change in ﬁrms’ dividend policy in response to a
tax reform. In contrast, slower growing, more mature ﬁrms with extensive funds and
relatively lower investment opportunities are able to ﬁnance their investments with
retained earnings. Their reaction will be in line with the new view, which predicts
no policy change in response to a reform. When diﬀerentiating ﬁrms by their ability
to self-ﬁnance their investments and thus, by separating “traditional view ﬁrms” from
“new view ﬁrms”, a divergent reaction of the two groups concerning tax reforms would
point to a tax eﬀect not biased by unobserved macroeconomic inﬂuences.
To concentrate on the reactions immediately connected with a tax reform, we tighten
our time horizon around the reform of the year 2002. In the years from 1999 to 2005, we
use two measures to separate the ﬁrms in our sample. Cash is a stock ﬁgure standing
for the cash and cash-equivalent holdings of a company. Cashflow is a ﬂow ﬁgure which
stands for the sum of net income and all non-cash charges or credits of a company. From
these values, we construct two dummy variables, Cashdummy and Cashflowdummy,
which equal 1 for observations in the top 33 deciles of the sample, indicating high cash-
or new view ﬁrms.18 Table 10 provides the results of the regressions including these
new controls.
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For both, Cashdummy and Cashflowdummy, the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 5% and the 1% level respectively. This is in line with the notion in the literature,
that ﬁrms with extensive cash holdings or high cash ﬂows are mature ﬁrms, which
pay out higher dividends (Grullon et al. (2002), p. 422). Both interaction variables,
Cashdummy£µavg and Cashflowdummy£µavg, show coeﬃcients with a negative sign
which are signiﬁcant at the 5% and the 1% level respectively. Firms’ reaction to a tax
reform is considerably lower, when their cash holdings or cash ﬂows lie in the top third
of the sample. This is in line with the new view of dividend taxation, predicting that
these ﬁrms self-ﬁnance their investment needs and thus, are not aﬀected by changes
in dividend taxation. The results for the original variables Cash and Cashflow point
18 In the Worldscope database, Cash is equivalent to Cash and Equivalents - Generic (02005);
Cashflow is equivalent to Funds From Operations (04201). Univariate statistics for Cash,
Cashflow and the two dummies are available upon request.
23into the same direction. As in the regressions before, our set of control variables was
included here as well, with only marginal changes in their coeﬃcients. These results
are evidence of a clear tax eﬀect on distribution policy. Groups of ﬁrms with diﬀerent
tax sensitivity reacted diﬀerently to the reform of 2002, while they were all exposed to
the same macroeconomic inﬂuences.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that taxation is an important factor for managers deciding
on their ﬁrm’s payout policy. The German tax reform of 2002 signiﬁcantly reduced the
former disadvantageous taxation of capital gains for many investors. In line with the
traditional view of dividend taxation, German decision-makers reacted to the declining
tax advantageousness of dividends compared to capital gains by considerably cutting
back their dividend payments. From 2008 on, distributions have been plummeting in
the wake of the recent economic crisis. The reform of 2009 aligned the taxation of
dividends and capital gains for all investors by abolishing the beneﬁcial taxation of
capital gains for individual investors. Our results predict, that this will have a positive
eﬀect on dividend distributions in the economy.
To study the impact of taxation on payout behavior, we analyze a sample of all 931
ﬁrms listed at the Frankfurt stock exchange from 1993 to 2009. We choose this sample,
because the German corporate tax system was reformed twice in this period, which
provides a valuable setting of a natural experiment. To model the environment around
payout policy decisions as closely as possible, we carefully calculate the tax burden
on dividends and share repurchases, which are taxed as capital gains, for diﬀerent in-
vestor classes and weigh the burdens according to a typical German ﬁrm’s shareholder
structure. In our regressions, we test three diﬀerent measures of dividend payments.
Our results provide evidence for a solid link between taxation and payout policy. The
dividend yield, the likelihood to pay a dividend and the likelihood to initiate dividend
payments are signiﬁcantly and positively correlated to the relative tax advantageous-
ness of dividends compared to capital gains. To test the robustness of our ﬁndings, we
subject our hypothesis to diﬀerent compositions of the sample and apply the underly-
ing economic theory to share repurchases, the most important alternative to dividend
24payments. We obtain corroborative results. We further strengthen our conclusions
with evidence from a diﬀerences in diﬀerences approach. Again, the results show a
clear tax inﬂuence on distribution policy along the line of the theory.
There is plenty of opportunity for further research. Particularly, it would be interesting
to see if an extension to a more international setting, including detailed models of the
tax systems of other countries, conﬁrmed the results. In an international setting, it
would be possible to control for country speciﬁc, macroeconomic eﬀects. Additionally,
a more distinguished modeling of a ﬁrms shareholder structure or the use of actual ﬁrm
speciﬁc weights, although diﬃcult to achieve, could prove very helpful. All of these
approaches will most likely help to further enhance future research on the link between
taxation and payout policy.
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28Table 1: Evolution of tax rates in Germany 1993-2009
This table shows the evolution of individual and corporate tax rates from 1993 on. The column Regime shows the
eﬀective tax system in each year. FI stands for full imputation system, HI for half-income system and FT denotes ﬂat
tax system. The columns tmin
pers and tmax
pers show the personal income tax rate for individuals in the lowest and the highest
income tax bracket, respectively. The columns tret
corp and tdis
corp show the corporate income tax rates for retained and
distributed proﬁts. Sol depicts the rate of the solidarity surcharge imposed, Subst denotes the percentage of ownership






1993 FI 19.0% 53.0% 50.0% 36.0% 0.0% 25.0%
1994 FI 19.0% 53.0% 45.0% 30.0% 0.0% 25.0%
1995 FI 19.0% 53.0% 45.0% 30.0% 7.5% 25.0%
1996 FI 25.9% 53.0% 45.0% 30.0% 7.5% 25.0%
1997 FI 25.9% 53.0% 45.0% 30.0% 7.5% 25.0%
1998 FI 25.9% 53.0% 45.0% 30.0% 5.5% 25.0%
1999 FI 23.9% 53.0% 40.0% 30.0% 5.5% 10.0%
2000 FI 22.9% 51.0% 40.0% 30.0% 5.5% 10.0%
2001 FI 19.9% 48.5% 25.0% 25.0% 5.5% 10.0%
2002 HI 19.9% 48.5% 25.0% 25.0% 5.5% 1.0%
2003 HI 19.9% 48.5% 26.5% 26.5% 5.5% 1.0%
2004 HI 16.0% 45.0% 25.0% 25.0% 5.5% 1.0%
2005 HI 15.0% 42.0% 25.0% 25.0% 5.5% 1.0%
2006 HI 15.0% 42.0% 25.0% 25.0% 5.5% 1.0%
2007 HI 15.0% 45.0% 25.0% 25.0% 5.5% 1.0%
2008 HI 15.0% 45.0% 15.0% 15.0% 5.5% 1.0%
2009 FT 15.0% 45.0% 15.0% 15.0% 5.5% 1.0%
Source: Based on Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007): Datensammlung zur Steuerpolitik, pp. 57, 58.
29Table 2: Tax burden in Germany 1993-2009
This table shows the tax burden for individual investors without substantial interest, for individual investors with
substantial interest and for corporate investors since 1993. The column Y ear shows the year in which the shareholder
acquires the distribution. Earnings generated and taxed on the corporate level in year t are distributed and taxed on
the shareholder level in year t + 1. The column Regime shows the tax system eﬀective on the shareholder level in each
year. FI stands for full imputation system, HI for half-income system and FT denotes ﬂat tax system. tmin
div stands for
the total tax burden on a dividend on the shareholder level, received by a shareholder in the minimum tax bracket.
tmax
div denotes the same for a shareholder in the maximum tax bracket. tmin
cg and tmax
cg stand for the total tax burden
on a capital gain received by a shareholder in the minimum or maximum tax bracket, respectively. The columns tdiv
and tcg show the burden on dividends and capital gains for the corporation retaining the payment.
Individual investor Individual investor Corporate










1993 FI 19.0% 53.0% 51.9% 51.9% 19.0% 53.0% 61.0% 77.4% 50.0% 75.9%
1994 FI 19.0% 53.0% 50.0% 50.0% 19.0% 53.0% 59.5% 76.5% 45.0% 72.5%
1995 FI 20.4% 57.0% 45.0% 45.0% 20.4% 57.0% 56.2% 76.3% 48.4% 71.6%
1996 FI 27.8% 57.0% 48.4% 48.4% 27.8% 57.0% 62.7% 77.8% 48.4% 73.3%
1997 FI 27.8% 57.0% 48.4% 48.4% 27.8% 57.0% 62.7% 77.8% 48.4% 73.3%
1998 FI 27.3% 55.9% 48.4% 48.4% 27.3% 55.9% 62.5% 77.2% 47.5% 72.9%
1999 FI 25.2% 55.9% 47.5% 47.5% 25.2% 55.9% 60.7% 76.8% 42.2% 69.6%
2000 FI 24.2% 53.8% 42.2% 42.2% 24.2% 53.8% 56.2% 73.3% 42.2% 66.6%
2001 FI 21.0% 51.2% 42.2% 42.2% 21.0% 51.2% 54.3% 71.8% 42.2% 66.6%
2002 HI 34.1% 45.2% 26.4% 26.4% 34.1% 45.2% 34.1% 45.2% 27.3% 27.3%
2003 HI 34.1% 45.2% 26.4% 26.4% 34.1% 45.2% 34.1% 45.2% 27.4% 27.4%
2004 HI 34.0% 45.1% 28.0% 28.0% 34.0% 45.1% 34.0% 45.1% 28.9% 28.9%
2005 HI 32.2% 42.7% 26.4% 26.4% 32.2% 42.7% 32.2% 42.7% 27.3% 27.3%
2006 HI 32.2% 42.7% 26.4% 26.4% 32.2% 42.7% 32.2% 42.7% 27.3% 27.3%
2007 HI 32.2% 43.9% 26.4% 26.4% 32.2% 43.9% 32.2% 43.9% 27.3% 27.3%
2008 HI 32.2% 43.9% 26.4% 26.4% 32.2% 43.9% 32.2% 43.9% 27.0% 27.0%
2009 FT 38.0% 38.0% 38.0% 38.0% 23.8% 39.8% 23.8% 39.8% 16.5% 16.5%
30Table 3: Evolution of the tax variable µ in Germany 1993-2009
This table shows the evolution of the tax variable µ in Germany for individual investors without substantial interest,
for individual investors with substantial interest and for corporate investors from 1993 on. The column Y ear shows the
year in which the shareholder acquires the distribution. Earnings generated and taxed on the corporate level in year t
are distributed and taxed on the shareholder level in year t + 1. The column Regime shows the eﬀective tax system in
each year. FI stands for full imputation system, HI for half-income system and FT denotes ﬂat tax system. µ shows the
relative taxation of dividends to capital gains for diﬀerent groups of shareholders. min and max denote shareholders
in the minimum and maximum tax bracket, while nsub stands for individual investors without substantial interest, sub
for individual investors with substantial interest and corp for corporate investors.
Individual investor Individual investor Corporate






1993 FI 1.683 0.977 2.078 2.078 2.078
1994 FI 1.620 0.940 2.000 2.000 2.000
1995 FI 1.447 0.782 1.818 1.818 1.818
1996 FI 1.398 0.833 1.937 1.937 1.937
1997 FI 1.398 0.833 1.937 1.937 1.937
1998 FI 1.408 0.854 1.937 1.937 1.937
1999 FI 1.424 0.839 1.904 1.904 1.904
2000 FI 1.312 0.799 1.730 1.730 1.730
2001 FI 1.367 0.845 1.730 1.730 1.730
2002 HI 0.895 0.744 1.000 1.000 1.000
2003 HI 0.895 0.744 1.000 1.000 1.000
2004 HI 0.916 0.763 1.000 1.000 1.000
2005 HI 0.921 0.778 1.000 1.000 1.000
2006 HI 0.921 0.778 1.000 1.000 1.000
2007 HI 0.921 0.763 1.000 1.000 1.000
2008 HI 0.921 0.763 1.000 1.000 1.000
2009 FT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
31Table 4: Average tax variable µavg in Germany 1993-2009
This table shows the development of the tax variable for a German ﬁrm with an average shareholder structure from 1993
on. The column Y ear shows the year in which the shareholder acquires the distribution. Earnings generated and taxed
on the corporate level in year t are distributed and taxed on the shareholder level in year t + 1. The column Regime
shows the eﬀective tax system in each year. FI stands for full imputation system, HI for half-income system and FT
denotes ﬂat tax system. µmax
nsub and µcorp depict the relevant tax variables for the investor classes of individual investors
and corporate investors, respectively. wmax
nsub and wcorp depict the weights for the investor classes of individual investors




1993 FI 0.977 2.078 0.280 0.720 1.770
1994 FI 0.940 2.000 0.274 0.726 1.709
1995 FI 0.782 1.818 0.266 0.734 1.542
1996 FI 0.833 1.937 0.274 0.726 1.634
1997 FI 0.833 1.937 0.293 0.707 1.613
1998 FI 0.854 1.937 0.306 0.694 1.605
1999 FI 0.839 1.904 0.343 0.657 1.539
2000 FI 0.799 1.730 0.355 0.645 1.399
2001 FI 0.845 1.730 0.327 0.673 1.440
2002 HI 0.744 1.000 0.331 0.669 0.915
2003 HI 0.744 1.000 0.342 0.658 0.912
2004 HI 0.763 1.000 0.337 0.663 0.920
2005 HI 0.778 1.000 0.336 0.664 0.925
2006 HI 0.778 1.000 0.345 0.655 0.923
2007 HI 0.763 1.000 0.326 0.674 0.922
2008 HI 0.763 1.000 0.268 0.732 0.936
2009 FT 1.000 1.000 0.269 0.731 1.000
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2010): Ergebnisse der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Finanzierungsrechnung für Deutschland
1991 bis 2009, Statistische Sonderveröﬀentlichung 4, pp. 82-115.
32Table 5: Composition of the sample and adjustments
This table shows the composition of our sample of all ﬁrms listed at the Frankfurt stock exchange (CDAX) from 1993
until 2009 and the adjustments due to missing data and outliers. In each step, the number of remaining observations is
given.
CDAX, 1993-2009: 931 ﬁrms Observations
Total 10,129
Elimination due to missing data
Cash Dividends Paid -2,491
Pre-tax Income -377
Market Price - Year End -432
Closely Held Shares -450
Total Debt/Total Assets -6
Market Capitalization/Common Equity -2
Total 6,371
Handling of outliers
Truncation of the 1. and/or 100. percentile
(Cash Dividends Paid, Pre-tax Income,
Market Price - Year End, Closely Held Shares,
Total Debt/Total Assets, Market Capitalization/Common Equity) -725
Total 5,646
Source: WorldScope, September 2010.
Table 6: Selected ﬁrm characteristics
This table shows selected characteristics of the ﬁrms in our sample. Panel A describes the breakdown of observed ﬁrm-
years to diﬀerent sectors. The division was carried out by using the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC), the relevant
divisions are given in parentheses. Agr:=Min: stands for Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing and Mining (Division A and
B), Constr: stands for Construction (Division C), Manuf: stands for Manufacturing (Division D), Utility stands for
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services (Division E), Trade stands for Wholesale Trade
and Retail Trade (Division F and G), Finance stands for Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate (Division H), Service
stands for Services (Division I), Admin: stands for Public Administration (Division J). Panel B provides some basic
parameters of ﬁrms in our sample. All monetary variables are deﬂated by the consumer price index. n indicates the
number of observations for each variable. MarketCap: denotes the Market Capitalization, TA stands for Total Assets,
TDebt denotes Total Debt, Op:Inc: stands for Operating Income, EPS denotes Earnings per Share and DPS denotes
Dividends per Share.
Panel A: Observations by sectors
Sector Agr./Min. Constr. Manuf. Utility Trade Finance Service Admin.
54 94 2,703 353 507 945 990 0
Panel B: Basic ﬁrm parameters (in thousands of Euros)
Variable n Mean S.D. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max
Market Cap. 5,642 2,183,020 8,167,360 190 35,834 139,579 743,349 213,793,900
TA 5,646 12,731,075 76,716,360 742 69,668 236,596 1,287,620 2,193,953,000
TDebt 5,642 4,413,065 28,148,502 0 3,834 32,859 212,100 605,997,100
Op.Inc. 5,579 134,183 714,929 -5,605,000 -3,194 3,748 35,902 15,383,000
EPS 5,640 1.3731 53.9175 -1,570.0 -0.0700 0.5275 1.7665 3,184.5
DPS 5,616 1.1782 5.2558 0.0000 0.0000 0.2140 0.7500 250.00
33Figure 1: Development of dividend measures
Panel A provides an overview over the development of the means of our three dividend measures, the dividend yield
Divyield, the number of dividend payers Divpaid and the number of dividend initiations Divinit, over time. Panel B
plots the dividend yield Divyield against the tax variable µ (theta), against Index, a national all-share price index taken
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34Table 7: Descriptive statistics of regression variables
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the multivariate analysis. Panel A summarizes our
sample of regression variables. The Column Expsign presents the sign expected for the coeﬃcients of the multivariate
analysis. Divyield stands for Cash Dividends Paid scaled by Market Capitalization, Income denotes Pre-tax Income
and is scaled by Total Assets, µavg is the weighted average of the tax variable, Trend is the relative change between
Market Price - Year End in t and t ¡ 1, Closely denotes Closely Held Shares, Lev stands for Total Debt divided by
Total Assets, Q stands for Tobin’s Q, Divpaid is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm paid out a dividend and
Divinit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm has initiated dividend payments or raised its dividend for at least
20%. The index t ¡ 1 indicates a variable that is lagged by one year. Panel B presents the correlation matrix for our
sample, signiﬁcance levels are given in parentheses.
Panel A: Variables used in the regressions
Variable n Mean S.D. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max Expsign
Divyield 5,646 0.0185 0.0211 0.0000 0.0000 0.0128 0.0322 0.0963
Incomet¡1 5,646 0.0329 0.1474 -1.1488 0.0016 0.0392 0.0949 0.7462 +
µavg 5,646 1.1788 0.3026 0.9124 0.9201 0.9363 1.5387 1.6344 +
Trendt¡1 5,646 0.0342 0.4933 -0.9309 -0.2609 -0.0097 0.2388 2.4737 -
Closelyt¡1 5,646 0.4663 0.3287 0.0000 0.1443 0.5037 0.7499 0.9955 -
Levt¡1 5,646 0.2065 0.1920 0.0000 0.0315 0.1671 0.3279 0.8508 -
Qt¡1 5,646 2.2546 2.0786 -3.9200 1.0800 1.6800 2.7000 17.4100 -
Divpaid 5,646 0.5925 0.4914 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Divinit 5,613 0.2117 0.4085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Panel B: Correlation Matrix




µavg 0.1672 0.1030 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Trendt¡1 -0.0017 0.3109 0.0142 1.0000
(0.8935) (0.0000) (0.2278)
Closelyt¡1 0.1019 0.0992 0.1057 0.0247 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0532)
Levt¡1 0.0461 -0.0721 0.0046 -0.0526 -0.0192 1.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.6737) (0.0000) (0.1044)
Qt¡1 -0.1048 0.1657 0.1876 0.2496 0.0470 -0.1200 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Divpaid 0.7341 0.3634 0.2057 0.1298 0.1546 0.0147 0.0629 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2031) (0.0000)
Divinit 0.3296 0.2316 0.0566 0.1815 0.0199 -0.0119 0.0794 0.4800 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1075) (0.3065) (0.0000) (0.0000)
35Table 8: Taxation and dividend distribution 1993-2009
This table shows the results of the ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions of our three measures of dividend distribution behavior.
The ﬁrst three columns present the results from regressions over the whole sample, the last three columns present the
results from regressions excluding ﬁrm-years from the ﬁnancial sector. Column (1) presents the results for Divyield,
which stands for Cash Dividends Paid scaled by Market Capitalization. Column (2) presents the results for Divpaid,
a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm paid out a dividend. Column (3) presents the results for Divinit, a dummy
variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm has initiated dividend payments or raised its dividend by at least 20%. Income denotes
Pre-tax Income and is scaled by Total Assets, µavg is the weighted average of the tax variable, Trend is the relative
change between Market Price - Year End in t and t ¡ 1, Closely denotes Closely Held Shares, Lev stands for Total
Debt divided by Total Assets, Q stands for Tobin’s Q. The index t ¡ 1 indicates a variable that is lagged by one year.
One star, two stars and three stars denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and the 1% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors are given in parentheses.
Full sample Excluding ﬁnancials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Divyield Divpaid Divinit Divyield Divpaid Divinit
Incomet¡1 0.0307*** 0.6020*** 0.3979*** 0.0280*** 0.5630*** 0.3615***
(0.0029) (0.0608) (0.0520) (0.0031) (0.0646) (0.0540)
µavg 0.0053*** 0.1540*** 0.0641** 0.0059*** 0.1508*** 0.0773***
(0.0016) (0.0328) (0.0253) (0.0017) (0.0364) (0.0287)
Trendt¡1 -0.0035*** 0.0004 0.0911*** -0.0035*** 0.0033 0.0928***
(0.0004) (0.0102) (0.0137) (0.0005) (0.0104) (0.0148)
Closelyt¡1 -0.0040** -0.0896** -0.0359 -0.0037** -0.0765** -0.0487
(0.0015) (0.0353) (0.0315) (0.0018) (0.0378) (0.0348)
Levt¡1 -0.0084*** -0.2486*** -0.1884*** -0.0107*** -0.2487*** -0.2527***
(0.0031) (0.0806) (0.0636) (0.0038) (0.0856) (0.0756)
Qt¡1 -0.0011*** 0.0029 0.0023 -0.0012*** 0.0009 0.0063
(0.0002) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0002) (0.0051) (0.0045)
Constant 0.0174*** 0.4778*** 0.1706*** 0.0172*** 0.4673*** 0.1552***
(0.0022) (0.0430) (0.0365) (0.0025) (0.0470) (0.0407)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,646 5,646 5,613 4,701 4,701 4,679
Adjusted R2 0.517 0.625 0.115 0.525 0.634 0.113
F-statistic 30.15 28.52 30.35 25.27 20.84 25.82
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
36Table 9: Taxation and share repurchases 1998-2009
This table provides an overview over our univariate and multivariate analysis of share repurchases from 1998 to 2009.
The ﬁrst graph in Panel A shows the development of the mean of the share repurchase measure Repyield, which stands
for the share repurchase yield or Common/Preferred Stock Redeemed, Retired, Converted, Etc. scaled by Market
Capitalization. The two following graphs provide plots of Repyield against the tax variable µavg and against Index, a
national all-share price index taken from OECD.stat. Panel B shows the results of the ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions
of our three measures of share repurchases. The ﬁrst three columns present the results from regressions over the whole
sample, the last three columns present the results from regressions excluding ﬁrm-years from the ﬁnancial sector. Column
(1) presents the results for Repyield. Column (2) presents the results for Reppaid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if
a ﬁrm repurchased shares. Column (3) presents the results for Repinit, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm has
initiated share repurchases or raised its repurchases by at least 20%. Income denotes Pre-tax Income and is scaled by
Total Assets, µavg is the weighted average of the tax variable, Trend is the relative change between Market Price - Year
End in t and t ¡ 1, Closely denotes Closely Held Shares, Lev stands for Total Debt divided by Total Assets, Q stands
for Tobin’s Q. The index t¡1 indicates a variable that is lagged by one year. One star, two stars and three stars denote
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Repyield Reppaid Repinit Repyield Reppaid Repinit
Incomet¡1 0.0130*** 0.2466*** 0.2277*** 0.0145*** 0.2799*** 0.2445***
(0.0047) (0.0775) (0.0590) (0.0054) (0.0868) (0.0641)
µavg -0.0052*** -0.1315*** -0.0419* -0.0053*** -0.1211*** -0.0339
(0.0014) (0.0351) (0.0239) (0.0015) (0.0381) (0.0265)
Trendt¡1 0.0006 -0.0145 -0.0028 0.0005 -0.0205 -0.0122
(0.0006) (0.0155) (0.0129) (0.0007) (0.0161) (0.0133)
Closelyt¡1 -0.0013 -0.0781* -0.0380 -0.0014 -0.0831* -0.0249
(0.0014) (0.0412) (0.0299) (0.0016) (0.0457) (0.0321)
Levt¡1 -0.0125*** -0.1122 -0.0628 -0.0122*** -0.0630 -0.0128
(0.0038) (0.1000) (0.0716) (0.0038) (0.1175) (0.0790)
Qt¡1 -0.0000 0.0046 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0044 0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0055) (0.0040) (0.0003) (0.0062) (0.0045)
Constant 0.0115*** 0.3354*** 0.1622*** 0.0111*** 0.3161*** 0.1327***
(0.0021) (0.0534) (0.0382) (0.0021) (0.0575) (0.0404)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,337 3,327 3,290 2,849 2,841 2,807
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.293 0.100 0.110 0.280 0.0984
F-statistic 3.616 3.897 3.469 3.150 3.469 2.906
Prob > F 0.0016 0.0008 0.0022 0.0049 0.0023 0.0086
37Table 10: Taxation and unobserved macroeconomic inﬂuences 1999-2005
This table shows the inﬂuence of taxation on the distributions of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in the period from 1999 to 2005
by employing ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions. In all regressions, the dependent variable is given by Divyield, standing
for Cash Dividends Paid scaled by Market Capitalization. µavg is the weighted average of the tax variable. Column (1)
presents the results using Cash as a control variable and Cash £ µavg as an interaction term, with Cash standing for
the Cash and Cash-equivalent Holdings of a company. Column (2) shows the results including Cashdummy, a dummy
variable that equals 1 for observations in the top 33 deciles. Column (3) presents the results using Cashflow, which
stands for Net Income and Non-cash Charges or Credits. Column (4) shows the results including Cashflowdummy, a
dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in the top 33 deciles. The index t ¡ 1 indicates a variable that is lagged
by one year. One star, two stars and three stars denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and the 1% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Cash Cashﬂow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Divyield Divyield Divyield Divyield
µavg 0.0082*** 0.0087*** 0.0083*** 0.0090***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Casht¡1 0.0135
(0.0096)












Cashﬂowdummyt¡1 £ µavg -0.0087***
(0.0030)
Constant 0.0116*** 0.0111*** 0.0113*** 0.0097***
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,009 3,009 2,969 2,969
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.601 0.603 0.608
F-statistic 9.417 9.912 9.559 10.97
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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